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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between audit committee characteristics
and earnings management. Samples in the study included 50 industrial companies listed on the
Amman Stock Exchange ASE. Two models were used to measure earnings quality: one which
depends on earnings continuity as an indication of quality, and one which depends on the
decrease of discretionary accruals of quality, using pooled data regression for the two tests
(Ordinary Least Squares OLS and Binary Logit). The study found that there was an influence of
some standard characteristics of audit committee on earnings quality.
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1. Introduction
Corporate governance has created significant changes in business environments in general, and
in the accounting and auditing professions in particular. Interest in the role of audit committees
has increased in the last few years because it is the tool of corporate governance, whose aim is to
increase the questioning of the board of management and to increase the role of audit and its
independence, after several financial failures of many local and international companies
(Hamdan & Mushtaha 2011). During the last years, there was, as well, an increasing
organisational interest in the role of the audit committee in preparing financial reports (Martnez
& Fuentes 2007). The Wild (1994) study found that the credibility and fairness of financial
reports issued by companies depends on the existence of an audit committee emerging from
management councils of such companies, while Martnez and Fuentes (2007) found that an audit
committee would be more active in the process of monitoring financial statements and limiting
the differences between the management and the external auditor. This reduces the probability of
the company receiving qualified opinions from the external auditor resulting from accounting
errors or non-commitment to accounting standards.
Many countries and local and international vocational bodies now spend more effort to
issue instructions and standards, which when adopted help restore credibility in the financial data
declared. This also helps in activating the role of audit committees, which consolidates
functioning and independence of the external auditor as an impartial party providing his opinion
on the declared financial data fairly and objectively. One of these efforts is the recommendation
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Exchange Commission, New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASDA), to form a Blue
Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999) to be a natural reaction to the distortions in financial statements.
These committees aimed to develop recommendations which help improve financial reports
through consolidating their role. It also put down a series of qualities which should prevail in
order to have an active audit committee. Such qualities include: size of committee, experience,
financial knowledge of members, degree of their independence, and frequent meetings. In July
2002, the USA’s Sarbanes-Oxley law was described by analysts to be the most significant and
comprehensive American legislation since the forming of the SEC because of its impact on
general companies and independent accountants. Some of the large reforms that the legislation
included were the right of declaration, submission of financial reports by foreign general
companies’ corporate governance, and monitoring of accounting auditors. According to article
301 of the legislation, a special part was made stressing the duties and formation of an audit
committee, in order to secure the safety and credibility of the report of the external auditor who
might be subjected to managerial pressure. As for Jordan, much legislation supporting corporate
governance was issued in order to regulate the work of audit committees in Jordanian companies.
Our study attempts to discuss such legislation related to audit committees to ensure their
application by Jordanian companies. Afterwards, the study tries to test the role played by audit
committees in improving earnings quality. Qaraqish (2009) sees that earnings quality means the
absence of such earnings, from estimations and substitutes by which the company tries to get a
targeted net return.
The real contribution of the current study to existing literature is to provide additional
evidence about the relationships between audit committee characteristics and earnings quality
from developing countries. It also uses the new models to measure the earnings quality in
Jordanian corporations, which was not used in previous studies in this environment (such as
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Qaraqish 2009). The importance of this study is to look for relationships between the audit
committee characteristics and earnings quality in Jordan, which regularly takes steps towards the
regulatory and legislative structure to support economic development. This distinguishes this
study from other studies conducted in the United States and Australia.
The following sections of the study discusses previous studies and study methodology,
including the study sample, study models, hypotheses, and methods of measuring variables.
These will be followed by a discussion of the the empirical results as well as a conclusion and
recommendations.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Audit Committees
The concept of audit committees differs according to the goals, functions, and responsibilities
assigned to them. Al-Thuneibat (2006) defined it as the committee that is composed of nonexecutive directors in the establishment. The major goal behind forming the audit committee is
to increase auditing quality and questioning of board of directors. Arens et al. (2009) defines it as
a group of persons selected from members of the board of directors who are responsible for
retaining independence of the auditor.
Many studies were concerned with checking qualities of audit committees as one of the
tools of corporate governance, with many influences like controlling earnings management, or
improving financial reports, and earnings quality. Hamdan and Mushtaha (2011) conducted a
study with the aim of analyzing the relationship between the possibility of the company receiving
an audit clean report and the characteristics of the audit committees of the industrial Jordanian
companies listed in ASE. The findings of their study showed a positive impact for the size of the
audit committee members on the report of external auditor. They also showed a negative impact
for stock ownership of members of audit committees on the report of the external auditor. At the
same time, the independence of (executive and non-executive) members of the audit committee
or the number of meetings had no impact on the opinion of the external auditor. The study of
Stewart and Munro (2007) from Australia focused on the results of frequent meetings on the
audit committee. They determined that the presence of an audit committee, the number of its
meetings and the auditor’s attendance for such meetings reduces audit risks, and that the external
auditor believes that the presence of an audit committee is an important factor in reducing
substantial risks of auditing. They further determined that reducing such risks is also affected by
frequent meetings of the audit committee and auditor's attendance of such meetings. Stewart and
Munro also found no substantial influence of the audit committee, either on the tests conducted
by external auditor or on the time spent by the external auditor and his team in the process of
auditing. The audit committee helps in solving disputes and conflicts with the administration and
that leads to more improvement in audit quality. However, there is a relationship between the
possibility that the company receives qualified reports from the external auditor and the presence
of the audit committee characteristics (independence, size, meeting times, and financial
experience). In answering this question, Martinez and Fuentes (2007) applied this on Spanish
companies listed in the stock exchange, which voluntarily formed an audit committee after the
Spanish corporate governance code was issued in 1998 (known as the Olivencia Code). The
findings of their study might be outlined as follows: ownership concentration affects the
possibility of the company receiving a qualified report; the outcome of errors or noncommitment; the presence of the audit committee can never be of the factors related to the
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company conservative non-verified report; the presence of an audit committee doesn’t reduce the
probability of the company receiving a qualified report resulting from errors or non-commitment;
and the size and independence of members of the audit committee are variables that have an
important statistical impact on the company receiving a qualified report.
As for the ability of the audit committee to control earnings management, the study of Saleh
et al. (2007) tried to evaluate the role of some qualities of the audit committee with regard to
independence of committee members, its size, its frequency of meetings, and the experience and
knowledge members of the committee have to monitor management behaviour. The practices
related to earnings management of the general Malaysian joint-stock companies, and the conflict
between managers and external auditors, might exist due to the choice of alternative accounting
procedures related to earnings management. Some of the most important findings of the study
are: absolute independence among members of an audit committee reduces the practices of
earnings management in the Malaysian companies; and the companies whose members of audit
committees are distinguished for experience, financial knowledge, professionalism, and frequent
meetings have less practices of earnings management when compared to other companies. The
study of Mazlina et al. (2006) tried to test the relationship between characteristics of the audit
committee and those of the internal audit committee, to evaluate the contribution of internal
auditors in auditing financial statements. It conducted that by designing and distributing a
questionnaire to internal executive auditors in 76 general Malaysian companies listed in the
financial market. The most important findings were: there was a positive relationship between
the internal auditors’ evaluation regarding their contribution in auditing financial statements and
three audit committee characteristics: rate of independence of its members, knowledge and
experience which the members have in fields of accounting and auditing and reviewing programs
of internal auditor.
Results show that the most effective audit committees and good resources regulating
internal auditing tend to be positively related to the evaluation of internal auditors in their
contribution to external auditing. Sweiti (2006) endeavored to develop a model to consolidate the
role of audit committees in Jordanian joint-stock companies for the purpose of strengthening the
function and independence of external auditing. This would eventually lead to improved audit
quality and increased credibility of the financial declared data, which helps consolidate the trust
of the financial society in such data.
The study distributed a questionnaire to a randomly selected sample representing general
Jordanian joint-stock companies. The sample included general managers, financial managers,
and directors of internal and external auditors in the year 2005. Some of the most important
findings of the study were that recently formed audit committees in the Jordanian corporations
did not have the necessary requirements needed to effectively play their role, and did not have
any significant impact on the effectiveness and independence of the external audit.
The study of Carcello and Neal (2003) focused on the relationship between audit committee
independence and disclosure quality. The two researchers used the external auditor report, size of
audit committee, and size of board of directors as control variables. The most important findings
of the study were:
a) there was a significant positive relationship between the percentages of the
independentmembers of the audit committee and the optimistic disclosure about the
financial status of the company
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b) there was no statistical relationship between the size of both board of directors, audit
committee and optimistic disclosure with regard to the status of financial notes and
administrative discussions and analyses
c) there was a significant positive relationship between audit committee independence and
financial reports quality
The study of Felo et al. (2003) on the relationship between audit committee characteristics
“regarding: financial experience, independence, and committee size”, and financial information
quality, came up with the following findings:
a) there is an adverse relationship between the independence of audit committee members
and financial deviations
b) a positive relationship exists between the financial experience of audit committee
members and the quality of published financial information
c) there is apositive relationship between the sizes of audit committees and quality of
financial information
Finally, the study of Al-Farah (2001) aimed to measure how active the audit committees
were in the Jordanian corporations, from the viewpoint of directors of internal and external
auditors. It also attempted to know the most important factors that help consolidate efficiency of
such committees from the point of view of members of these audit committees. The study dealt
with all the companies that have audit committees by the end of December 2000. The most
important findings of the study were:
a) the audit committees of Jordanian companies were active from the viewpoint of internal
auditing, but never from the viewpoint of the external auditors
b) some of the factors that consolidate the role of audit committees are: the financial or
accounting background of one member of the audit committee; the independence of
members of the audit committee; the existence of written evidence
The regulations of Jordanian audit committees
Jordan tried to enact legislation to support corporate governance, one of which is the stock
exchange law no. 76; 2002. That law obliges all Jordanian joint-stock companies to form an
audit committee consisting of three non- executive members from the company's board of
directors. The duties and responsibilities of such committees are determined by the instructions
issued by the board which comply with article (46). It also secures banking law no. (28) 2000
which obliges all Jordanian banks to form audit committees. Articles no. (32) and (33) of this
law determine responsibilities and duties. Instruction no. (1) 1998 issued by the Amman Stock
Exchange requested all Jordanian joint-stock companies to form audit committees. Modern
disclosure instructions were issued and were put into effect at the beginning of 2004. Article no.
(15) explained how to form the audit committee, determining its duties and responsibilities. The
most recent concept of audit committees in Jordanian milieu was the one issued by the Amman
Stock Exchange stating the “directory of governance rules of companies listed in Amman Stock
Exchange 2008”, which stipulates that the audit committee should consist of non-executive
members of the board of directors who shouldn't be less than three. Two of them at least should
be independent members, one of whom chairs the committee. All members of the committee
should be equipped with knowledge of financial and accounting affairs. Decisions of the
committee are taken by absolute majority of members. It should also put down written
procedures to regulate its duties and commitments with the approval of the board of directors. It
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has the right to ask for legal, financial, administrative or technical opinion from any external
consultant.
2.2. Earnings Quality
Various definitions of earnings quality
Investors’ concerns with earnings quality increased during the last decade after many
international companies announced non-authentic and temporary earnings as part of their
quarterly reports. Thus, investors became more cautious in considering net earnings. Qaraqish
(2009) and Ohlson and Feltham (1995) define earnings quality as the investor’s ability to predict
future abnormal earnings depending on recent data. But Qaraqish (2009) sees that the real
earnings quality is the one honestly and justly announced by the companies as their actual
earnings. In other words, the announced earnings of companies have a substantial financial
existence which is void of exaggeration or probability figures. Many of the definitions of
earnings quality revolve around the two previous ones. Earnings quality is the ability of the
present earnings to provide a real picture about the company and its ability to survive in the
future. The significance of earnings quality stems from the earnings on which many parties
depend when they take their decision (Dechow 1884).
Bagava (2006) believes that earnings quality is considered an important factor in the
financial statement and is used as a guidance to decision making. Depending on earnings of low
quality leads to an inappropriate management of fortune (Schipper & Vincent 2003).
Understanding earnings quality plays an important role in the process of financial analysis;
earnings of high quality help financial analysts in analyzing three basic sides of information.
These arethe present functional performance of the company, future functional performance, and
value of the company (Dechow & Schrand, 2004). In addition, earnings quality might be used as
an indicator of dividends. Farinha (2007) ascertains that there is a relationship between earnings
quality and dividends: the possibility of dividends by companies increases as the quality itself
improves, and the amount of such dividends also increases. There are different views regarding
the concept of earnings quality: while some use earnings continuity as a standard of its quality as
explained by Altamuro & Beatty (2006), the continuity of earnings refers to the relationship
between the present earnings with the future ones. As earnings are divided into cash flows and
accruals, quality earnings means that cash flows are more than accruals (Sloan 1996). Others
indicate that earnings quality is better once free from earnings management practices: the less the
discretionary accruals are, the better the quality is (Francis et al. 2004; Dechow & Dichev 2002;
Al-Sharif 2008). Different styles for measuring earnings quality led to different evaluations,
where the same company might be given a higher or lower quality level according to the
earnings quality form adopted (Abdelghany 2005).
Previous studies:
Baxter and Cotter (2009) studied the formation and characteristics of audit committees and their
impact on improving earnings quality in a sample of Australian companies before obligatory
requirements were introduced to audit committees in 2003. The results of that study showed that
forming an audit committee reduces earnings management, but did not reduce accrual estimation
errors. The study also showed that there was a significant relation between the financial
experience of members of audit committee and earnings quality improvement. The other
qualities of the audit committee did not have any relatively significant relationship with earnings
quality. Various studies provided many other factors influencing earnings quality. Teitel and
56

Hamdan, Mushtaha & Al-Sartawi | Audit Committee Characteristics: Jordan

Machuga (2010) found that supporting rules of corporate governance contributed to the
improvement of earnings quality. Altamuro and Beatty (2006) also found that internal control
quality played a role in improving earnings quality. In comparing public firms with private ones,
Givoly et al. (2010) found that the former were more conservative in their financial reports than
the latter, and that their management practice through using normal accruals was less.
Consequently, earnings quality in these firms was better than that in the private ones and that
was due to the desire of the directors of public firms to avoid litigation risk and agency costs.
With regard to the relationship between auditing quality and improving earnings quality,
Hamdan and Abu Ijeila (2010) found that auditing quality of audit offices in Jordan did not
contribute to limit earning management practices in Jordan industrial companies subject to
auditing. Such offices never played a role in increasing earning qualities in Jordanian industrial
companies. But Teitel and Machuga’s (2010) study on the impact of the application of Code of
Best Governance Practices in the presence of external auditors from highly qualified audit
offices found that it helps improve earnings quality. Balsam et al. (2003) studied the impact of
one of the auditing quality professional auditor’s specialisation on discretionary accruals and
found that the companies which used professional specialised auditors had less discretionary
accruals compared to the companies which used less professionally specialised auditors.
Therefore, one can claim that companies with professionally specialised auditors enjoy a higher
level of earnings quality.
3. Research Design and Methodology
3.1. Study Sample
The study sample included all Jordanian industrial corporations listed in ASE which met the
conditions of having all necessary data available, and having never been merged or delisted
through the period of the study. 50 companies met such conditions from 2004–2009. We focus
on the six-year window 2004-2009 because the Code of audit committee was voluntary in 2002
and portions of the Code became mandatory in the Securities Market Law in 2004. The corpus of
the study is composed of all Jordanian industrial corporations listed on the ASE 94; the final
sample consists of 50 companies, the sample-selection procedure is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Sample selection
Sector
Pharmaceutical and Medical Industries
Chemical Industries

Listed
companies

Excluded
companies

7

2

5

Study
sample

14

7

7

Paper and Cardboard Industries

5

1

4

Printing and Packaging

2

1

1

16

10

6

Food and Beverages
Tobacco and Cigarettes

3

2

1

Mining and Extraction Industries

16

9

7

Engineering and Construction

12

2

10
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Electrical Industries
Textiles, Leathers and Clothings
Glass and Ceramic Industries
Total

58

6

4

2

10

3

7

3

3

0

94

44

50
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3.2. Technique of Measuring Variables and Study Models
3.2.1. Measuring Independent Variables: Characteristics of Audit Committees
The characteristics of the audit committees we studied were based on many past studies. Table 2 shows the measuring of independent
variables.
Table 2: Measuring of audit committees characteristics
Variable

Label

Measurement

Characteristics of Audit Committees:
Audit Committee Size

ACSize

This was measured through members of that committee elected by board of
directors.

Audit Committee Independence

ACIndep

With reference to the instructions of Jordanian disclosure, we find that ASE
requires an audit committee to stem from the board of directors and should
totally consist of non-executive members. Therefore, we will adopt this quality
to determine the independence of audit committee. This committee that
totally comprises non-executive members is given (1), but if not all the
members were non-executive, it is given (0).

Number of Audit Committee Meetings

ACActivity According to the directory of corporate governance of companies listed in ASE
and Jordanian disclosure instructions, the audit committee must meet
regularly. These meetings should not be less than four every year. Thus, this
variable was measured through the number of annual meetings the
committee holds.

Financial Experience of Audit Committee
Members

ACExper

The financial experience of the audit committee measured by dividing the
number of qualified members in accounting financial and banking
management by all members.

Percentage of Common Stocks Owned by Audit
Committee

ACOwner

This was measured through the percentage of ownership of the audit
committee for company stocks.
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3.2.2. Measuring of Dependent Variable: Earnings Quality
This study adopted two of the commonest models for measuring earnings quality which are the
Richardson et al. (2005) model, and the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al.
(1995). We used the two models to confirm the results.
The first model
There are different interpretations for earnings quality, and among them is the use of earnings
continuity as an indicator of earnings quality (Altamuro & Beatty 2006; Schipper & Vincent
2003). Sloan (1996) explained that earnings quality implies continuity of cash flows more than
accruals continuity. Richardson et al. (2005) developed a model to determine the range of
earnings continuity in the future as the following equation no. 2 shows.

ROI i ,t +1 = γ 0 + γ 1 (ROI i ,t − TACC i ,t ) + γ 2TACC i ,t + υ i ,t +1
Where:

............. (1)

ROIi,t+1: is return on investment for firm (i) in the next year (t+1)
γ0: is constant
γ1: is continuity of cash flows
γ2: is continuity of accruals
ROIi,t: is return on investment for firm (i) in year (t)
TAACi,t: is total accruals for firm (i) in year (t)

Earnings quality means that next year's earnings represented in returns on investment
(ROAi,t+1 dependent variable in equation no. 1) is affected by earnings of the current year
represented in γ1 coefficient more than total accruals represented in the γ2 coefficient. Then, our
hypothesis in the previous equation is γ2-γ1<0 which indicates continuity of earnings in the
coming years is more than the continuity of accruals as γ2<γ1 known as earnings quality. To
concentrate on the continuity of accruals in earnings quality; we modify the equation to become
equation no. 2 as follows:

ROI i ,t +1 = ρ 0 + ρ1 ROI i ,t + ρ 2TACC i ,t + υ i ,t +1

............. (2)

This equation might be rewritten regarding accruals continuity in equation no.1 as follows:

ROI i ,t +1 = γ 0 + γ 1 (ROAi ,t ) + (γ 2 − γ 1 ) TACC i ,t + υ i ,t +1

............. (3)

As ρ1=γ1 and ρ2=(γ2-γ1), this evaluation saves us the direct evaluation for γ1-γ2 in equation no.1.
Our first hypothesis is still ρ2<0 as it is more negative in accruals representing earnings that
imply the presence of high quality earnings. This model will be given the symbol (EQR).
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The second model
The second measure of earnings quality is the use of the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
To extract discretionary accruals, we used the modified version of the Jones (1991) model
adjusted by Dechow et al. (1995). This model will be given the symbol (EQJones), which is one
of the most used methods in measuring earnings management that is used in the opposite
direction of measuring earnings quality. As earning management means the intentional
interference in preparing financial reports by managers to achieve personal interests (Schipper
1989), thus the opportunistic earnings management negatively affects earnings quality; this
implies that the increase of management earnings is followed by a reduction in earnings quality
(Baxtert & Cotter 2009). Calculating discretionary accruals can be done through the following
steps:
a) total accruals evaluation which is the difference between net income and operating cash
flows, according to the previous equation no. 1
b) slope evaluation β1,β2,β3 in the following linear model:
TACC i ,t
Ai ,t −1
Where:

 1 
 ∆REVi ,t − ∆RECi ,t
 + β2 
= α + β 1 


Ai ,t −1
 Ai ,t −1 


 PPEi ,t

 + β3 

 A
 i ,t −1



 +  i ,t



................. (4)

TACCi,t: is the total accruals of firm (i) in year (t)
Ai, t-1 : is the total assets of firm (i) at the end of year ( t-1)
REVi,t : is the change in revenues of firm (i) between years (t) and (t-1)
RECi,t : is the change in receivables of firm (i) between years (t) and (t-1)
PPEi,t : is the level of fixed assets of firm (i) in year (t)
li,t : random error

c) Normal accruals evaluation, using, β1,β2,β3 derived from equation no. 6 as follows:
 1 

(
) (
)
NACC i ,t = β1 
 + β 2 ∆REVi ,t − ∆RECi ,t + β 3 PPEi ,t ................. (5)
A
 i ,t −1 
Where:

NACCi,t: is the normal accruals of firm (i) in year (t)

d) After evaluating total and normal accruals, discretionary accruals (Abnormal), resulting
from the pursuit of earnings management, are computed as follows:
ANACC i ,t = TACC i ,t − NACC i ,t ................. (6)

The reduction of absolute value of discretionary accruals reflects a decrease in opportunistic
earnings management, which eventually leads to the increase of earnings qualities reducing
dishonesty, and thus expressing the real status of the company.
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3.2.3. Measuring of Control Variables
Big 5 Jordanian audit firms
DeAngelo (1981) inferred that the big audit firms were more able to provide audit services of
high quality than other offices. Such a thing qualifies them to monitor administration behaviour,
contribute to the prevention of distortions in financial statements, and increase earnings quality.
To achieve its goals, this study depended on the division adopted by Faraj (2005) and Balhaj
(2006) in classifying Jordanian audit firms into small and large ones. It determined the five big
firms in Jordan and accordingly assigned (1) to refer to the companies whose financial reports
are audited by the large firms, and the value (0) to refer to the companies whose financial
statements are audited by small firms.
Company size
The variable of the company size was used as a controlling one to study the difference between
the small and large companies with regard to earnings quality. Natural log of total assets was
used to measure company size.
Degree of financial leverage
This percentage is used to evaluate the efficiency of financial policies adopted by company
management, in addition to being one of the significant indicators that explain how suitable the
financial published reports of joint-stock companies are (Matar 2006). As for the goals of this
Study, it used the overall ratio of percentage of debts to assets to be an indication of financial
leverage in the sample of this study.
The percentage of the common stocks owned by members of the board of directors
According to the agency theory, it was proposed that the dominance of members of the board of
directors on higher levels of company stocks will lead to gain earnings of high quality with many
privileges. This was emphasised by Qaraqish (2009) who found a positive relation between the
stock ownership of members of the board of directors and earnings quality. Thus, our study
included this variable through which the percentage of stock ownership of members of board of
directors was measured.
The external auditor turnover
According to the study of Shokley (1982), the long relationship between the company and the
external auditor may make the auditor non-creative and thus adopt less rigid audit techniques and
depend on procedures and solutions of company without verification. The two researchers tended
to measure the level of the auditor's turnover through the number of years of his work in auditing
in companies.
Auditor's specialisation in customer’s industry
This variable was listed among the controlling variables because it was believed that the
auditor’s specialisation in the customer’s industry will lead to a better auditing quality. This
consequently leads to increased administration monitoring and preventing manipulation of
financial statements, thus leading to the betterment of earnings quality. Dummy value, 1 if the
Auditor's Specialisation in Customer's Industry; 0 otherwise.
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3.2.4. The Relation Between Characteristics of Audit Committees and Earnings Quality
In our research on the relationship between audit committees and earnings quality, we measured
earnings quality using two models at the first stage. While examining the relation between audit
committees and earnings we designed two major models to measure this relation in which the
dependent variable was the earning quality. Therefore, two linear models were created, each of
which contains two measures of audit committees and a group of control variables, to control the
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Thus, the models used to
represent the relation between audit committees and earnings quality are four in number.

First Model
In the first regression model the dependent variable “earnings quality” was measured by using
the Richardson et al. (2005) model and expressed through the continuous variable (EQRCVi,t) as
follows:
EQRCVi ,t = β 0 + β 1 ACSize i ,t + β 2 ACIndep i ,t + β 3 ACActivity i ,t + β 4 ACExperi ,t + β 5 ACOwneri ,t
+ β 6 Big 5 i ,t + β 7 Size i ,t + β 8 FinLav i ,t + β 9 Maown i ,t
+ β 10 EAprof i ,t + β 11 EATurn i ,t + ε i ,t

......... (7)

Where:
EQRCVi,t: is a continuous variable: dependent variable: earnings quality measured through (Richardson et al., 2005)
model for the company (i) in the year (t)
ACSizei,t: is number of audit committee members for the company (i) in the year (t)
ACIndepi,t: is dummy variable, audit committee independence for the company (i) in the year (t)
ACActivityi,t: is number of audit committee meetings for the company (i) in the year (t)
ACExperi,t: is dummy variable, the financial experience of members of the audit committee for the company (i) in
the year (t)
ACOwneri,t: is the percentage of common stocks owned by audit committee for the company (i) in the year (t)
Big5i,t: is control variable, dummy variable, size of the audit firm with the value of 1 if audited by Jordanian Big5
and 0 otherwise for the company (i) in the year (t)
Sizei,t: is control variable, the company size measured by natural log of total assets for the company (i) in the year
(t)
FinLavi,t: control variable, financial leverage ratio, total debts/total assets of the company (i) in the year (t)
Maowni,t: control variable, The percentage of the Common Stocks Owned by Members of the Board of Directors
for the company (i) in the year (t)
EAprofi,t: control variable, specialization of external auditor in the customer’s industry. It is a dummy variable given
(1) if the auditor is specialised in the customer’s industry, or else given (0) for the company (i) in year (t)
EATurni,t: control variable, external auditor turnover, measured by number of years of work for the external
auditor of the company (i) at the end of the year (t)
εi,t: random error.

Second Model
In the second regression model, the dependent variable “earnings quality” was measured by the
Richardson et al. (2005) model, and was expressed through the dummy variable EQRDVi,t as
follows:
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EQRDVi ,t = β 0 + β 1 ACSize i ,t + β 2 ACIndep i ,t + β 3 ACActivity i ,t + β 4 ACExperi ,t + β 5 ACOwneri ,t
+ β 6 Big 5 i ,t + β 7 Sizei ,t + β 8 FinLav i ,t + β 9 Maowni ,t
+ β 10 EAprof i ,t + β 11 EATurn i ,t + ε i ,t

......... (8)

Where:
EQRDVi,t: is a dummy variable: the dependent variable ‘earnings quality’ is measured by using (Richardson et al.,
2005) model, (3) for high earnings quality (2) of doubtful earnings quality (1) for lower earnings quality of
the company (i) in the year (t).

Third Model
In the third regression model, the dependent variable “earnings quality” was measured by the
absolute value of discretionary accruals elicited through the Jones (1991) model as follows:
EQJones i ,t = β 0 + β 1 ACSize i ,t + β 2 ACIndep i ,t + β 3 ACActivity i ,t + β 4 ACExperi ,t + β 5 ACOwneri ,t
+ β 6 Big 5 i ,t + β 7 Sizei ,t + β 8 FinLav i ,t + β 9 Maowni ,t
+ β 10 EAprof i ,t + β 11 EATurn i ,t + ε i ,t

......... (9)

Where:
EQJonesi,t is a continuous variable: the dependent variable ‘earnings quality’ was measured by Jones (1991) model
for the company (i) in the year (t)

Fourth Model
In the fourth regression model, the dependent variable “earnings quality” was measured by the
absolute value of the discretionary accruals elicited by Jones (1991) model and explained
through the dummy variables as follows:
EQJonesDVi ,t = β 0 + β 1 ACSize i ,t + β 2 ACIndep i ,t + β 3 ACActivity i ,t + β 4 ACExperi ,t + β 5 ACOwneri ,t
+ β 6 Big 5 i ,t + β 7 Sizei ,t + β 8 FinLav i ,t + β 9 Maowni ,t
+ β 10 EAprof i ,t + β 11 EATurn i ,t + ε i ,t

......... (10)

Where:
EQJonesDVi, t: is a dummy variable, the dependent variable ’earnings quality’ was measured by Jones (1991) model,
(1) for low quality earnings (2) for doubtful earnings quality and (3) for high earnings quality of the company
(i) in the year (t)
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4. Empirical Results and Discussion of Findings
4.1. Description Statistical of Study Variables
4.1.1. Description of Continuous Variables
Size of the audit committee
From 3 we notice that the average size of a committee is three members, while the largest
number of any committee is four. These results emphasize to the administration that the audit
committee should not be very big, as that might lead to a decrease in coordination and problem
solving, in addition to not being able toperform the duties in a perfect manner (Martinez &
Fuentes 2007). As a result, the Jordanian corporations committed themselves to the minimal size
the committee must have in compliance with the Jordanian rules of corporate governance and
legislations. This is what the study of Mayalah (2008) arrived at when conducting the study in a
Jordanian environment.
Financial experience of members of the audit committee
It was found that 40% of the members of the study sample have financial experience with slight
differences from one year to another. It was also noticed that audit members in some companies
do not have any financial experience, while all members in some other ones have that
experience. We can conclude that most of the Jordanian industrial companies abide by the rules
of corporate governance with respect to the financial experience that minimally one of the
members must have. This goes in line with the opinion that the experience one member has in
corporate governance and financial reports preparation, along with knowledge in auditing, will
most likely help understand the attitude of the auditor and his evaluations in order to side with
him when conflict emerges with company management (Dezoort & Salterio 2001).
The annual number of meetings of the audit committee
Table 3 shows that the audit committee of the study sample meets four times a year on average.
The highest number of meetings for the companies was five a year, and the least was three. This
shows that Jordanian industrial companies abide by the governance laws regarding the number of
meetings of the audit committee.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for 50 industrial Jordanian listed companies during 2004-2009
Panel A: Continuous variables
Variable

Year

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

AC Members

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005

3.043
3.042
3.041
3.041
3.042
3.044
0.403
0.427

0.206
0.202
0.200
0.200
0.202
0.208
0.259
0.263

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

0
0

1
1

AC Experience
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AC Meeting

ACOwn

Company Size

Leverage

MAOWN

Auditor Turnover

2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

0.432
0.432
0.434
0.434
4.196
4.229
4.204
4.143
4.229
4.178
8.631
10.277
11.789
11.826
12.222
14.370

0.262
0.262
0.265
0.271
0.542
0.425
0.645
0.456
0.472
0.442
16.015
17.965
20.027
16.758
17.174
19.474

0
0
0
0
3
4
3
3
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0

29,342,925
30,927,269
34,467,122
59,738,663
72,645,856
27,680,673
32.192
29.812
29.934
31.561
26.927
27.315
15.960
16.694
16.299
16.234
14.253
13.200
5.283
5.313
5.449
5.429
5.250
5.133

78,077,897
76,857,839
75,385,919
167,000,000
185,000,000
43,238,763
22.290
23.041
21.912
24.627
19.797
20.329
20.875
20.176
20.591
19.631
17.522
16.391
1.311
1.291
1.022
1.080
1.407
1.618

560,000
450,258
784,000
430,303
800,000
1,000,000
1.820
2.310
1.690
0.890
0.790
0.310
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
2.000
2.000
3.000
2.000
2.000
1.000
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1
1
1
1
5
5
5
5
5
5
68.85
73.58
98.61
68.85
68.85
79.15
413,000,000
406,000,000
386,000,000
916,000,000
1,080,000,000
240,000,000
85.910
88.010
92.770
99.480
93.930
88.300
89.250
89.250
89.250
89.250
89.250
89.250
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
6.000
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Panel B: Dichotomous variables
Variable

Year

Frequency of 1’s

Frequency of 0’s

AC Indep.

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

35 (70%)
35 (70%)
36 (72%)
38 (76%)
35 (70%)
35 (70%)
34 (68%)
34 (68%)
34 (68%)
34 (68%)
31 (62%)
30 (60%)
22 (44%)
23 (46%)
23 (46%)
23 (46%)
23 (46%)
23 (46%)

15 (30%)
15 (30%)
14 (28%)
12 (24%)
15 (30%)
15 (30%)
16 (32%)
16 (32%)
16 (32%)
16 (32%)
19 (38%)
15 (40%)
11 (22%)
11 (22%)
11 (22%)
11 (22%)
11 (22%)
11 (22%)

Big5

Prof.

Panel C: Dummy variables of earnings quality
Variable

Year

High EQ

Doubtful EQ

Low EQ

EQRDV

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

24 (48%)
25 (50%)
24 (48%)
24 (48%)
22 (44%)
24 (48%)
46 (92%)
43 (86%)
43 (86%)
41 (82%)
45 (90%)
41 (82%)

1 (2%)
0 (0%)
1 (2%)
1 (2%)
0 (0%)
1 (2%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

25 (50%)
25 (50%)
25 (50%)
25 (50%)
28 (56%)
25 (50%)
04 (08%)
07 (14%)
07 (14%)
09 (18%)
05 (10%)
09 (18%)

EQJonesDV
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The ratio of common stocks owned by audit committees
We notice that the average amount of stocks the audit committee owns is 11%. The maximum
percentage of ownership of the company’s stock was 98%. In other companies the audit
committee did not own any stocks of the delisted one. This explains why members of the audit
committee are selected from those who are influential in decision making because of their owned
stocks in the company.
Company size
Regarding size of the company which is a controlling variable, we notice that the mean of
company sizes listed in the study sample increased from one year to another, but decreased in
2009, possibly due to the international financial crisis.
Financial leverage
Financial leverage is one of the control variables. The mean of the sample study in this respect
was 34%. This reflects a big difference because the Jordanian industrial companies depend on
foreign financing when financing their assets.
Ratio of the common stocks owned by boards of directors
This too is one of the control variables. We found that the ratio of stocks owned by members of
boards of directors was 15%. Thus boards of directors as a whole owned 89% of the stocks,
which represent the highest percentage in the study sample. In some companies the board of
directors does not own any stock percentage and this complies with the Al-Sharif (2008) study in
his description of the ownership of the board of directors in the Jordanian milieu.
The average turnover of the auditor
Annual turnover is measured by the years of experience the auditor spent in the same company.
It was found that the average years of the auditor’s work in the same company was five out of
six-the period the study covers. In other words, the auditor continues for 83% of his auditing in
the same company. The data revealed that there were some auditors who lasted auditing the same
company throughout the period of the study. The shortest period of work for the auditor in the
same company was one year.
4.1.2. Description of Dichotomous Variables
Independence of members of audit committees
Table 3 part B shows that 70% of the study sample has audit committee members who are
distinguished for their independence the first and the second years of the study. This percentage
increased to 76% the third year and went down to 70% for the rest of the years. Meanwhile we
found that few companies of the sample study, the audit committees in them, never met
independence standard and those covered 29% of the companies.
Large Jordanian auditing firms
As for the variable of the Big 5 and whether the company was audited by one of the biggest of
these five in Jordan, we noticed through the descriptive analysis that 66% of the sample
companies were audited through six years. This means that the big audit firms in Jordan have a
control over auditing for the majority of the general industrial joint- stock companies.
Auditor’s specialization in customer’s industry
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Part B of table 3 shows that 44-46% of the sample companies are audited by auditors specialised
in their industry. This increases the opportunity to monitor company performance which might
help in improving earnings quality.
4.1.3. Description of Earnings Quality
The study used two methods to measure earnings quality: the Richardson et al. (2005) model and
the Jones (1995) model. In Table 3 part C, earnings quality was divided into three parts: high
earnings quality, low, and doubtful. By using the model of Richardson, et al. (2005), we notice
that 44-48% of Jordanian industrial company returns are distinguished by high quality, while 5056% of the returns of these companies are distinguished by low quality, and quite a few amount
of such returns are of doubtful quality. When using the model of Jones (1995), the results
showed that the highest percentage 82-92% of the returns of the Jordanian industrial companies
were distinguished by high quality while the rest of the companies were of low quality. There
were no returns of doubtful quality, according to the Jones (1995) model. Despite the differences
of results, they show that the returns of the Jordanian industrial companies are distinguished by a
reasonable quality, and that implies the ability to predict the future and highlight the status quo
of the company.
4.2. Testing Study Hypotheses
This study depends on two models for measuring the relationship between audit committees and
earnings quality. Each of these two models is divided into two sub-models. The first explains the
relationship between the dependant variable “earnings quality” with the continuous one. The
second model highlights the relationship between the dependant variable with the dummy one.
The main hypothesis is “There is an impact with statistical significance of the audit committee
characteristics (size of committee, degree of independence, financial experience of its members,
number of meetings, committee ownership of stocks) on improving earnings quality of Jordanian
corporations listed in ASE”. This hypothesis generates sub-hypotheses which tackle the impact
of every characteristic of the audit committee on the betterment of earnings quality. The
following are tests of study sub-hypotheses.
4.2.1. Testing the first sub-hypothesis
This hypothesis aims to test the impact of the size of the audit committee on improvement of
earnings quality. The first sub-hypotheses can be written as null-form:
H01: Size of the audit committee has no impact, with statistical significance, on the improvement
of earnings quality
Larger audit committees better monitor the preparation of financial reports and improve earnings
quality (Lin & Yang 2006). Size of audit committee is positively related to the quality of
financial reports (Hamdan and Mushtaha 2011; Felo et al. 2003). Size also helps reduce cheating
and forgery in financial statements (Huang 2005). As for the role of the size of audit committees
of Jordanian industrial companies in improving earnings quality, from Table 4 it is noticed that
the variable (size of audit committee ACSize) is negatively related, with statistical significance
to the earnings quality measured by Richardson et al. (2005). This model considers earnings
quality to be a continuation of future returns. As for the second model in Table 5, it doesn’t show
any relationship, with statistical significance, between the size of audit committee and earnings
quality measured by the modified Jones (1995) model. This model considers earnings quality to
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be the returns which include the minimal amount of discretionary accruals. This result differs
with findings of Qaraqish (2009) which found no relationship between the size of audit
committee and the improvement of earnings quality. This difference goes back to the models
used in measuring earning quality in this study and that of Qaraqish (2009), besides the
difference of the sample and period of study. The inappropriate increase in the size of audit
committee might lead to a decrease in the efficacy of activity of the audit committee due to the
waste in costs and muddling in work (Al-Farah 2001).
4.2.2. Testing the second sub-hypothesis
This sub-hypothesis attempts to answer whether or not the independence of members of the
committee contributes to the competence which improves earnings quality. The second subhypotheses can be written as null-form:
H02: Degree of independence of the audit committee has no impact, with statistical significant, on
the improvement of earnings quality
The basic notion is that their independence and control of administrative work improves
performance and earnings quality (Qaraqish 2009) and reduces practices of earnings
management (Saleh et al. 2007; Carcello et al. 2006). However, our study didn’t find any
influence for the dependence of members of the audit committee on improving earnings quality,
whether the model used was that of Richardson, et al. (2005) or the modified Jones (1995)
model. Independent members of the audit committees in Jordanian industrial companies never
contributed to the improvement of the quality of financial reports (Hamdan & Mushtaha 2011).
The independence that some members of the committee have is in form, not in execution,
because there is an apparent financial or family connection with members of audit administration
that appointed them. We were surprised to find that the audit committee in one of the companies
consisted of three brothers! For such reasons, independence of the committee never left any
impact on earnings quality. Such a result complies with that of Lin and Yang (2006), which also
never found any influence of that independence of members, with any statistical significance, on
earnings quality and financial reports. The study of McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) found
that the standard of independence of members of the audit committee, whether executive or nonexecutive, mostly reduces the role of the committee. Such a thing affects its supervisory and
controlling roles.
4.2.3. Testing the Third Sub-hypothesis
The third sub-hypothesis focuses on the influence of financial experiences of audit committee
members on improving earnings quality. The third sub-hypotheses can be written as null-form:
H03: The financial experience of members of the audit committee has no impact, with statistical
significant, on improvement of earnings quality
In Tables 4 and 5 we notice that there is statistical significance for the “AC Experience” variable
only in the second sub-model of the first model in which the earnings quality was illustrated
through dummy variables measured by the Richardson, et al. (2005) model. With regard to the
influence of financial experience, this study complies with many, like those of Hamdan and
Mushtaha (2011), which found that the financial experience of audit committee members had a
positive influence on the quality of financial reports.
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Table 4: Pooled regression results to first model
Variable
AC Members

Predicted
sign

+

AC Experience

+

-

Big5

+

Company Size

+

Leverage

+

MAOwn

-

Prof.

Ordinary Least Squares

Binary Logit

2.475
(0.015)
-0.472
(0.638)
-0.463
(0.644)
-2.353
(0.020)
5.509
(0.000)
6.431
(0.000)
-4.738
(0.000)
0.075
(0.941)
0.721
(0.473)
0.489
(0.626)
-2.100
(0.038)
8.616
(0.000)

-3.603
(0.000)
1.289
(0.197)
-3.167
(0.002)
2.294
(0.022)
-2.998
(0.003)
-4.265
(0.000)
3.620
(0.000)
-3.274
(0.001)
-2.142
(0.032)
0.423
(0.672)
0.786
(0.432)

+/-

ACOwn

Auditor Turnover (AT)

Model EQRDV

+/-

AC Indep.

AC Meetting

Model EQR

+/+

F-statistic
p-value
R-Square
Adjusted R-Square (Akaike)

0.439
(0.388)

0.705

OLS: t-test (top), p-value (bottom), two-tailed. Binary logit: z-test (top), p-value (bottom)
t-Critical: at df 39, and confidence level of 99% is 2.390 and level of 95% is 1.671 and level of 90% is 1.296
z-Critical: at confidence level of 95% is 1.650
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 50-11-1 = 38) and (df for numerator =β =11) and confidence level of 99% is 2.730 and
confidence level of 95% is 2.040
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Table 5: Pooled regression results to second model
Variable
AC Members

Predicted
sign

+

AC Experience

+

-

Big5

+

Company Size

+

Leverage

+

MAOwn

-

Prof.

Ordinary Least Squares

Binary Logit

1.452
(0.149)
-0.684
(0.495)
-1.665
(0.098)
1.207
(0.230)
-0.205
(0.838)
-0.867
(0.388)
1.989
(0.049)
-1.838
(0.068)
1.291
(0.199)
1.161
(0.248)
-0.730
(0.467)

0.142
(0.887)
-0.364
(0.716)
-0.543
(0.587)
-0.255
(0.799)
-1.877
(0.061)
1.190
(0.234)
0.490
(0.624)
0.622
(0.534)
-1.084
(0.279)
0.768
(0.442)
0.546
(0.585)

2.997
(0.001)
0.213
0.142

0.884

+/-

ACOwn

Auditor Turnover (AT)

Model EQJonesDV

+/-

AC Indep.

AC Meetting

Model EQJones

+/+

F-statistic
p-value
R-Square
Adjusted R-Square (Akaike)

OLS: t-test (top), p-value (bottom), two-tailed. Binary logit: z-test (top), p-value (bottom)
t-Critical: at df 39, and confidence level of 99% is 2.390 and level of 95% is 1.671 and level of 90% is 1.296
z-Critical: at confidence level of 95% is 1.650
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 50-11-1 = 38) and (df for numerator =β =11) and confidence level of 99% is 2.730 and
confidence level of 95% is 2.040

The study of Saleh et al. (2007) found that the companies that had audit committees, whose
members are distinguished by financial experience, knowledge, and professionalism, are more
able to put an end to the practices of earnings management, manipulations, and deception in
financial statements. The study of McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) also found that
companies which did not encounter any problems in their financial reports most likely had audit
committees with professional accounting experience more than the ones that receive
conservative reports and suffer from many problems in their financial reports. The studies of
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Bryan et al. (2004) and Qin 2007 confirmed that the financial and professional experience the
members had was positively related to the quality of financial reports. It also had a contrarian
connection with distorted financial reports and earnings management (Huang 2005; Yang &
Krishnan 2005). This result goes in line with the findings of past studies which found that the
financial experience of audit committee members had an impact on the improvement of earnings
quality (Qaraqish 2009; Baxter & Cotter 2009; Xie et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2004).
4.2.4. Testing the Fourth Sub-hypothesis
The fourth sub-hypotheses can be written as null-form:
H04: Number of meetings of the audit committee has no impact, with statistical significant, on the
improvement of earnings quality
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) in its ten recommendations submitted on the audit
committee, disregarded the number of meetings of that committee. This omission was because
the committee didn’t find any absolute impact on the number of meetings in the companies’
control or on the improvement of financial reports quality (Hamdan & Mushtaha 2011). Many of
the studies like those of Lin and Yang (2006) confirmed that there was no effect from the
number of meetings of the audit committee on the quality of the financial reports. The study of
Rahman and Ali (2006) also confirmed that there was no decisive evidence to prove that there
was any effect from the number of meetings of the committee on earning quality as exemplified
in the reduction of illegal earnings management practices. In our study, we did not find any
impact of the number of meetings of the audit committee on earnings quality exemplified in the
reduction of discretionary accruals in returns as Table 5 shows. Such a finding complies with the
two studies of Qaraqish) (2009) and Baxter and Cotter (2009), who did not find any impact of
the number of meetings of the committee on the improvement of earnings quality. But in Table
4, we notice that the number of meetings had a positive impact, with statistical significance, on
improving earnings quality as found in earnings continuity. This result differs from the findings
of other studies.
4.2.5. Testing the Fifth Sub-hypothesis
The fifth sub-hypothesis tested the influence of the ratio of ownership of the stocks of the audit
committee on earnings quality. The fifth sub-hypotheses can be written as null-form:
H05: Ownership of stocks by members of the audit committee has no impact, with statistical
significant, on the improvement of earnings quality
The study of Hamdan and Mushtaha (2011) noticed that such ownership is negatively related to
the financial reports quality and positively connected with fraud and manipulation with financial
statements, in addition to the absence of commitment to accounting standards (Martinez &
Fuentes 2007), and the illegal practices of the earnings management (Yang & Krishnan 2005).
The findings of our study go along with this study for we found both that ownership of audit
committee of company stocks is negatively related, with statistical significance, to earnings
quality demonstrated through future continuity of earnings, and is also negatively connected,
with no statistical significance, to earnings quality demonstrated through low discretionary
accruals of earnings. Such a finding goes along with the studies of Qaraqish 2009; Beasly 1996)
which stated that the opportunity of deception in the financial statement decreases with the
presence of external auditors who are not members of company owners. The direct financial
interests of members of the audit committee deprive them the credibility of preventing
administration distortions of financial statements (Wright 1990).
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4.2.6. Testing the Main Hypothesis
The main hypothesis tests the role of the overall characteristics of audit committee on earnings
quality:
300

EarningsQuality ∫ ACSize; ACIndep; ACActivity; ACExper; ACOwner
n

Four models were used to test this hypothesis. In two of these models earnings quality was
illustrated through continuous variables. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) test was used in
testing. In the other two models earnings quality was illustrated through dummy variables; the
Binary Logit test was used as well. By having a look at the two models 2 and 3, one can notice
that the Adjusted R2 model which tests earnings quality, as being a continuity of earnings in the
future using the model of Richardson, et al. (2005), is bigger than the Adjusted R2 of the second
model, which tests the earnings quality through the decrease of discretionary accruals in both.
This was discovered through using the adjusted Jones (1995) model. Such a finding shows that
the first model best represents the relationship between characteristics of audit committee and
earnings quality. This reinforces the finding that the Akaike value of the first model using
dummy variables to express earnings quality is less than that of model two. When testing the
main hypothesis, the audit committee characteristics’ influence on earnings qualities can be
arithmetically explained as: null hypothesis (H0: β1=β2=β3=β4=β5=0) against the alternative
hypothesis one at least from (Ha: βi≠0). We found that F-statistic is more in its critical value in
the two models and P-value is less than 5%. Thus, we can say that the collective characteristics
of audit committees affect earnings quality.
4.3. Testing Control Variables
Large audit firms
Our findings show that when financial statements are audited by big audit offices in Jordan, this
helps returns continue in the future because such committees are highly qualified in their
performance and can force companies to abide by accounting principles. Large auditing offices
help improve the quality of financial reports (Hamdan & Mushtaha 2011). These big auditing
firms constitute a factor which helps reduce practices of earnings management that lead to issue
a clean report (Johl, et al. 2007). In addition, external auditing conducted through large firms
improves the credibility of financial statements. It also enforces a pressure on managers of
companies to implement methods to care for such companies (Becker et al. 1998).
Company size
Many studies like those of Hamdan and Mushtaha (2011) and Change and Walter (1996)
indicated that large companies enjoy a higher quality of financial reports than the smaller ones.
Thus, they are less susceptible to failure and closure as they attract the concern of both
shareholders and investors who have connections with financial markets. In our study, we found
a positive relationship between the size of the company and the earnings quality measured by the
model of Richardson, et al. (2005), while that relationship had no influence on the earnings
quality measured by the adjusted Jones (1995) model.
Financial leverage
The study of Qaraqish (2009) found that the companies with minimal financial leverage had
earnings of higher quality. In our study, we found the financial leverage had an impact on the
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earnings quality measured by the model of Richardson et al. (2005) as expressed through
EQRDVi,t. This effect was of a negative implication which means that the companies with
minimal debts have a higher earnings quality and this complies with the findings of the study of
Qaraqish (2009).
The ratio of the stocks owned by the board of directors
The findings of our study show that there is a negative relation between the ratio of stock
ownership of board of directors and earnings quality, but this relation has no statistical
significance except through the second sub-model. The ownership of stocks in the company by
the board of directors may push them to give priority to their personal interests and falsify
financial statements in order to achieve many goals such as bonus increment and other motives.
External auditor’s turnover
We didn’t find any relationship between the number of years of work for the external auditor and
the earnings quality. This result is the one reached at by Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) which
found that there was no decisive evidence that the period of the external auditor’s work in
auditing in the same company reduced or increased the quality of financial reports.
Specialisation of the auditor in the customer’s industry
The specialisation of the external auditor in the customer’s industry will provide him with the
knowledge and awareness of the company that qualifies him to monitor administration and to
force it to abide by accounting principles that prevent distortion of financial statements. It is
logical then to find that the variable EAprofi,t has a positive relationship with earnings quality,
but this relationship has no statistical significance, except through Sub-model one in which
quality was explained through the continuity of future returns.
5.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Audit committees are one corporate governance mechanism which aims to coordinate the
administration, external auditor, and monitoring of company performance in order to increase the
influence of the corporate governance and secure transparency of financial disclosure.
Therefore, this study aims to explore the status of forming audit committees in the
Jordanian industrial companies after a series of laws and legislation were issued by Jordan in this
respect. It also studies the influence of the qualities of audit committees on earnings quality
referred to in this study as the continuity of earnings in the future or for holding the lowest ratio
of discretionary accruals. The data were collected from 50 Jordanian industrial companies from
2004-2009.
The findings of the study show that the Jordanian industrial companies meet the demands of
forming auditing committees stipulated in Jordanian legislation. When testing its effect on
earnings quality, we realised that the size of the audit committee is inversely connected with
earnings quality measured by its ability to survive in the future. It is not suitable to increase the
size of the audit committee to a great extent in order to perform perfectly; the size should be
within the convenient range which makes it more effective.
We afterwards studied the role of independence of members of the audit committee in
making them more able to improve earnings quality, but we didn’t find any relationship between
this variable and earnings quality. We found that members of the audit committees of Jordanian
industrial companies were not independent. It was apparent that there was family and financial
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relationships between members and the boards of directors and that reduced their ability to
control company’s works and improve earnings quality; thus, we recommend that the authorities
organizing works of companies in Jordan to enact legislation that increase independence of
members of the audit committee. As for the financial experience of members of the audit
committee to improve earnings quality, and despite meeting that condition by the industrial
companies, we did not find any role to be played by it in improving earnings quality. This was
because members of the committee did not have enough experience to face manipulations in
financial statements and limit of earnings management: as a result, we recommend qualifying
members of the audit committee to enable them perform their duties.
Regarding the role of the numbers of meetings of audit committees to make them more
active in monitoring and improving their earnings quality measured through continuity, we found
that the increase in the number of meetings helps improve earnings quality.
Finally, we also found that stock ownership by members of the audit committee reduces
their independence and limits their ability to improve earnings quality. Based on these findings,
we recommend limiting the ownership of audit committee.
In general, we recommend that organisers of works of Jordanian companies, like the stock
market and government authorities, support the mechanism of corporate governance companies.
This will secure more transparency in disclosures, reduce practices of earnings management, and
improve earnings quality, for they all leave a significant impact on the economic decisions of
many parties.
However, with a small sample size, caution must be applied, as the findings might not be
generalisable. This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation, and it
is recommended that further research be undertaken in the following areas: the impact of audit
committee characteristics on enhancement of accounting conservatism; the relationship between
audit committee characteristics and company performance; and factors affecting the earnings
quality of Jordanian corporations.
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